Dev Raj Dahal
Senior Political Analyst
Nepal
Play Non-Zero Sum Game:
In an interconnected world, realists’ conflict model of global politics governed by a zero-sum game does not foster common aspirations for system stability. The China-India-US-Russia relations are in a steady flux, not stationary, in the coexistence of interests, entailing leaders to patch up their differences for a stable peace in a mixed game of multipolar world order. Interdependence between the former two and Nepal is growing based on Panchsheel, the Asian version of non-zero-sum game of inter-state relations. The US-Russia relations are confrontational while China-US ties are frosty, entailing a viable compromise on trade to have a cheery effect on other strategic areas, such as the South China Sea. India has its own geopolitical ambition to become a global power and, therefore, favors strategic autonomy in foreign policy. As long as Nepali leaders espouse democratic values, institutions and culture they will continue to anchor the civilizing influence of India, Europe and the USA and seek the same source of legitimacy. In no way it blinds them to China’s enormous rise to wealth, power and influence other than fervently engaging it in the nation’s infrastructure development and economic progress. Now independent Nepali scholars do not judge China by the Indian and the West’s media image. Scholarship, exposure visits and multilevel actors’ interaction, opening of Confucian centers in Nepal, etc. have made the Nepalis appreciate China’s cooperation of great strategic value. China’s leadership does not sense fear from India’s intrinsic strength. But it is anxious about India’s historical linkage with the West and the latter’s interest to inspire it to act as a counterweight to China’s growth of power, roles and image. Nepal cannot even enhance bargaining leverage by borrowed power and manipulate the fear of rival powers or take advantage of great powers’ discord and vulnerabilities but on the goodwill of all sides by becoming closer to each of them than they are with each other in a style of non-zero-sum game.
Set Careful Pathways to Win the Goodwill of all Sides:
Nepal cannot afford to be neutralized by India and China by their neighborhood first policies, tolerate overwhelming influence of one power, sustain geopolitical intimacy to one side by alienating the other or indulge in global adventurism without acquiring stability of governance, economic progress, social cohesion and eco-resilience. It needs strengthening the central authority and institutions of the state’s heartland, Kathmandu and its outreach in strategic zones, buffer areas and frontiers acting as centripetal force. Nepal is getting support from India, the Middle East countries, Southeast and East Asia for the expansion of labor market opportunities, Nepali diasporas in advanced nations support brain gain strategy. Peacekeeping role in the UN has increased its creative performance to relieve the distressed, amplified diplomatic relations for global creditworthiness, actively engaged in conference diplomacy for gaining visibility and articulation, etc.
To become effective, however, it has to reduce all negative indicators—human rights’ abuse, corruption, impunity, over exploitation of natural resources, government instability, etc and foster positive indicators such as creation of a business-friendly milieu and seek internal social cohesion, justice and positive peace.
The bond of dependency to sovereignty and democracy is negative as people cannot exercise their natural rights, nourish aspirations and a life of freedom. Nepal’s strategic geography offers it a better option than many Latin American nations whose debt, poverty and violence gave birth to dependency theory or African nations whose lack of progress is explained by resource curse theory. Nepal’s strategic geography has enabled it to serve the security and stability of both neighbors. But its vigor requires a stable foreign policy rationalized by an “epistemic community” with shared intellectual beliefs, stakes, skills and orientation in formulating creative solutions. Nepal also needs to diversify production of essential goods and generate surplus for expanding trade to mitigate poverty trap and muster national strength sufficient to play creative roles in world politics. Its new Constitution has adopted a midway stand between capitalism and communism.
But it demands the renewal of import-substituting and export-promoting industries allowing the state to engage in infrastructure building and economic planning so as to reduce the nation’s excessive dependence on the outside world and engage with the powers of all hues in a larger freedom. This can turn Nepal into a food surplus nation like until the 1980s. The neoliberal policies increased its total dependence on essential goods while national leaders’ Charwakian attitude increased per capita debt to about $600 and debt servicing ratio is mounting. Now imports are 17 times higher than exports. Nepal’s foreign policy needs to advance access to world markets and investments in productive areas mainly energy, infrastructures, agriculture, industries, health, education, communication, tourism, etc. through policy-driven strategy and secure self from geopolitical infection of land-lockedness, least developed and small market constraints.
Precisely Define Equidistant Multi-Polarism:
The dispersal of the world into a myriad of chess boards marks the evolution of lop-sided multi-polarity. The seeds of cold war and nuclear deterrence have obscured the universal dream of India, China, USA, Europe, Japan and Russia to the reality of their sphere of influence, not indulge in mutually assured destruction (MAD) and unbounded nuclear proliferation. Neither process assumes a stable peace in the world and enables the coordinating capacity of the UN for global governance. In this context, Nepal’s exercise of equidistant multi- polarism relative to the rise of multi-polar world order rests on neither playing a game of classical small state diplomacy, nor neutralism not even aligning with one power against the other. Diversification of Nepal’s dependence on diverse poles of power helps it to skirt coercion arising out of its undue dependence on only one power. LDCs, South-South cooperation and regionalism are precisely designed to achieve collective self- reliance. India rejection of tri-lateralism and Chinese refusal to accept “special relationship with India leave Nepal only this as a viable option. Unlike classical realists who define the world by unitary state-centric system driven by maximization of power to secure national security and survival, neo-realists define it with an array of actors where each seeks relative gain to stitch other’s cooperation, averting the Rousseau’s game of the stag hunt: “here in a competition for scarce goods states are often more interested in absolutist (domestic) gains than in common interests” (Hoffmann, 1973: 9). When powerful states are embedded in a web of interdependence yet driven by competition and conflict, cooperation does not become smooth.
The path of equidistant multi-polarism supposes that Nepal’s foreign policy will maintain comparable level of bilateral relations with neighbors and major powers for reasons of their different images, ideologies, institutions and capabilities upholding relatively equal level of significance based on the nation’s basic structural conditions of power base, needs and shifting circumstances. In the vocation of equidistance Nepali attention must be to other relatively autonomous powers – Germany, the UK, Russia, Japan, South Korea, South Africa, Brazil, the Islamic countries, etc, and small states outside any alliance, global institutions that animate multi-polarity and multi-laterization of ties. Its classical policy of realpolitik of positive neutralism in the neighborhood and idealpolitik of nonalignment in the multi-polar global sphere can overcome the fear psychology of closed spaces or merely resorting to a Manichean worldview, alternating one power for another.
Nepal in the past has exercised its conscience and kept issue differentiation with great powers. It favored the abolition of apartheid regime in South Africa backed by the USA and the UK, recognized Israel as a sovereign state but also the right of Palestine to self-determination, opposed war in Cambodia, the Soviet invasion of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, denuclearization, disarmament and global peace and security. It differed with both neighbors on voting in the UN and Human Rights Council on the Ukrainian proposal. It is also helpful to improve international creditworthiness and acceptability in a world wracked by fragmentation and collision of three aspirations of keeping the status quo, upsetting the status quo and revising the status quo.
The return of geopolitics marks a backlash against liberal trade order defined by the World Trade Organization (WTO) marking a propensity toward de-globalizaiton and localization. The UN has become weak in helping nations attain its general principles and Sustainable Development Goals. SAARC became a hostage of Indo-Pak conflict while Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Economic and Technical Cooperation (BIMSTEC) have not taken off. These regional bodies could not nurse the common interests. They have taken too many obligations without ample trust and means to fulfill them thus leaving the neo-functionalist approach to regional integration less exciting. The classical realism inspired Nepal to maintain equal self-distancing from super and regional powers’ politics for long and attain greater autonomy for progress through diversification of economic and political relations. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Pluralist Initiative of the West inspired Nepali leaders to join democratic fraternity, give up distancing and build “attributional affinity” with India and the West (Dahal, 2022:3). As this posed a security concern for China it too began to show ideological affinity with Communist Party of Nepal but soon derelicted its policy to renew ties with Nepali Congress Party. Nepal’s passion to join China- led initiatives such as Boao Forum for Asia, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), observer of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and execution of transit accord seems less enthusiastic. It is not ready to accept the Chinese offer to join Global Security Initiatives. The visiting senior leader of the ruling Communist Party of China, Liu Jianchao, said China is keen to improve its ties with India as it will guarantee “an Asia free from outside interference,” echoing earlier Japanese and Indian vision. The neorealist insight offers scope for equal connectivity without the sole hegemony of one side. Nepal’s vital foreign policy goal is to diversify ties to secure identity by distancing, excluding and rejecting external intrusion and preserving its own way of life. For Nepal, a modicum of trust in the neighborhood is a precondition to its relevant roles in the multi-polar world of no clear pattern.
Build National Consensus as an Adaptive Strategy:
The Indian lure to join the Quad, democratic fraternity and security frame of Indo-Pacific strategy adds muscle to its power but less sufficient enough to act independent of its old ally-Russia. China has offered India to work together in Nepal, Afghanistan and other nations. But the unsettled borders and strategic ties of China with Pakistan make India less excited in its connectivity projects. China views that the Sinophobic Western pressure on Nepal amounts to stifling its patriotic zeal for independent policy affable to China. Even India is suggesting Nepal to adopt a Look East and Look South policy. Despite national consensus on Nepal for signing BRI in May 2017, the West views China’s projects as a strategy of cutting their influence, replacing them and keeping Nepal under debt trap diplomacy, a view China bluntly rejects and welcomes them to invest in Nepal’s sustainable progress. A broad consensus exists within Nepal on the basic values and principles of foreign policy underlined in the Constitution of Nepal but not on a cluster of issues which divide political leaders, the recent examples being Venezuela and Ukraine crisis. In this context, Nepal’s international performance rests on the nation’s capabilities particularly how political parties will be able to evolve, not partisan consensus, but a policy-oriented one on the salient aspect of foreign policy (Khatri, 2001: 22).
Capacity building of Nepali foreign ministry, embassies and missions abroad and public debate on foreign policy issues is important so that leaders do not become the victim of their ignorance and make the nation hostage of their personal or partisan interests. Reforms are required in improving Nepal’s acceptability thus improving its passport rank which is 7 th weakest in the world and negotiation on European Union’s ban on Nepali airlines flying in its skies. Nepal was also defeated in the Asian chair of the UN General Assembly as the contest was done without homework while good preparation allowed it to be elected twice in the non-permanent member of Security Council. The national leaders must learn from historical insight and face problems including the review of human rights situation and transitional justice.
Nepali leaders’ awareness of multi-actors’ concerns is central to balancing its foreign policy, reap benefits, retain relative autonomy in its ties with neighbors and outside powers thus gaining symbolic rewards and reorder practical policy goals. Neo-realists argue that linkages limit the great powers’ infinite passion for extension of their self-interest and look for shared interests.
They should not be blind to the fact that the state hosts the sub-cultures of great powers in every sphere of national life. They act as geopolitical proxy for their communication, rationalization, lobby, pressure groups and activism thus requiring regulatory policy and adaptive strategy essential to beef up national integrity system and capacity for stable political order.
Negotiation skill based on give and take is a vital statecraft for Nepal to enhance national interests. Ties based on the cult of leaders die down when they vanish from the political scene but their effects linger. Realization of national goals demands navigation by the wisdom and lesion of history, mobilizing resources, settling vital issues, harnessing diplomatic skills and shared hope of future payoffs. This cuts fears of spoilers and international financiers backing centrifugal forces of the nation and risks bred by dependence, domination and penetration and generate hope of policy for diversification affirming multipoles of power. Nepal’s expectation of fairness and justice in international cooperation is justified for its opening to the post-national world. James N. Rosenau says, “The desirability and possibility of maintaining a balance among the internal and external demands can result in a politics of either promotive or preservative adaptation” (1981: 11).
Conclusion:
A brutal return of geopolitics has underscored the need for formulating a foreign policy of multi-polar equidistance to respond to various poles of power. Nepal as a small state needs to carefully maneuver to balance ties with neighbors and other great powers and become closer to each pole of power than they are with each other. In a multi-polar world order the nation has to find a new form of collaboration with many poles of power to promote its national interests and cope with tension arising from incoherence of internal needs and geopolitical imperatives to adapt to conflicting pulls by utilizing institutional memories of its realist orientation, statecraft, diplomacy, balancing strategy and national interests (Sebenius, Burns and Mnookin, 2018: xxiv). Its equidistant multi-polarism needs to beef up the nation’s global acceptability living up to its responsibilities, contributions and outreach. Nepal’s foreign policy of diversification shows a determination to liberate itself from the shackles of dependency and assert national interests by performing well in the tightrope walking of great powers’ pressures for conformity. To attain the best outcome in a geopolitical environment that is flux, uncertain and conflict-prone, Nepal has to plan careful pathways, make stronger its foreign ministry and missions abroad equipping them with creative ideas and policies arising from think tanks and universities, mollify the friendly nations and harness the zeitgeist with coherent foreign policy approach consistent with protection and promotion of core national interests while becoming eager to cooperate on mutually beneficial areas. Nepal-India- China air, road and railway connectivity will “convert the traditional constraints posed by the country’s landlocked state into an opportunity to expand trade” (Mahat, 2020:105).
It can enhance its image by becoming a habitat of global institutions, conferences and summits, like the one on Indo-Pak Dialogue, Myanmar Conference before the restoration of democracy, comprehensive security, migration, climate change, etc. It can become a site of entrepreneurs of values, soft power of ideas and policies like small Scandinavian states on ecological resilience, justice and peace, keep a new form of national, regional and global solidarity and pass judgment on international issues on the basis of merit without fear or favor. The other strategies are banding together with small, landlocked, least developed and mountainous nations in opposition to predatory powers, playing pressure group in international conferences and bodies like the UN, Inter-Parliamentary Union and Davos, supporting initiatives for disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peace zones, opposing imperialism, colonialism and intrusion in the internal affairs of other nations, joining international regimes and summits as a part of knowledge-gaining strategy, articulating enduring national self-determination on a global basis and sustaining constitutional and global duties. Nepal’s foreign policy path ahead, like strategy, must be incremental backed by insights, wisdom and capability.
# Thanks the distinguished author Professor Dev Raj DahalL Ed. Upadhyaya N. P
# Our own contact email address is: editor.telegraphnepal@gmail.com
# Concluding part.
References:
Adhikary, Dhruba Hari. 2005. “Question of Diplomatic Balance,” in Snadharva Bichar, Kathmandu.
Allison, Graham. 2017. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydide’s Trap?, London: Houghton and Muffin.
Bhattarai, Dinesh. 2022. “Nepal’s Non-Alignment Relevant for Ever,” The Rising Nepal, August 12.
Dahal, Dev Raj. 2022. Small States in a Globalized World: Vitality of Nepal’s Sovereign Life, Kirtipur: CNAS.
Douglas, ED. 2020. Himalaya: A Human History, London: Penguin Random House.
Ghimire, Yubaraj. 2022. “China Keen to Improve Ties with India,” Indian Express, July 11.
Elman, Miriam Fendius. 1995. “The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard” British Journal of Political Science, Vol 25, No. 2, April. .
Hoffmann, Dtanley, 1973. “Choices,” Foreign Policy, Number 12, Fall.
Khanal, Y. N. 1970. “Nepal in the World Today,” in Nepal: A Profile, Kathmandu: Nepal Council of Applied Economic Research.
Khatri, Sridhar K. 2001. “Nepal in the International System: The Limits of Power of a Small State,” ed.
Anand Aditya, The Political Economy of Small States, Kathmandu: NEFAS.
Mahat, Ram Sharan. 2020. “Yam between Two Boulders,” in Trials, Tremors and Hope: Political Economy of
Contemporary Nepal, New Delhi: Adorit Publications.
Mearsheimer, John J. 1999. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” The New Shape of
World Politics, New York: Foreign Affairs.
Rose, Leo E. and John T. Scholz. 1980. Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom,New Delhi: Select Book Syndicate.
Rosenau, James N. 1981. A Study of Political Adaptation: Essays on the Analysis of World Politics, London: Frances Printers.
Sebenium, James K, R. Nicholas and Robert H. Mnookin. 2018. Kissinger the Negotiator: Lessons from Dealmaking at the Highest Level, New York: Harper Collins Publication.
The Economist, 2022. “A New Geopolitics: The Post-Post-Cold-War World, “ The Economist, March 5th.
Note: Paper Presented at Sayapatri Society, Pokhara, August 19, 2022.