Dr. Manzoor Ahmad Naazer,
Assistant Professor, Department of Politics & International Relations,
International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan
Post Doc Research Fellow,
Department of Global Studies,
University of North Carolina, Wilmington.
Email: manzoor.ahmad@iiu.edu.pk
What’s app No. 92333 – 5524289
Abstract:
India and Nepal share religious, historical, cultural, and linguistic affinities and they both are highly connected with each other geographically and economically.
Both of them are predominantly Hindu states though they both profess secularism.
There also exist huge disparities between the two states that pose various challenges for them and also provide them opportunities to establish friendly and harmonious ties.
The nature of their bilateral relations largely depends on India’s policy and behavior towards Nepal.
The history of the past 70 years shows that India generally strived to exploit the inherent weakness of Nepal by supporting anti-state and / or anti-government elements including democratic movements, political dissidents, rebels, terrorists, insurgents and agitators etc.
India intermittently maneuvered events in Nepal by persistent intervention in the country.
The paper aims to explore as how and why India intervened in domestic affairs of Nepal.
It also investigates the overt and covert motives that New Delhi intended to pursue by undermining different governments in Kathmandu.
Key Words: India, Nepal, interference, monarchy, constitution, democracy, insurgency.
1. Introduction:
South Asian politics is generally explained in the context of Indo–Pakistan relations mostly mirrored by mutual hostilities, conflicts, tensions, border skirmishes etc.
Both countries have territorial disputes over which they fought several limited or major wars since their inception in 1947.
Their rivalries also undermined the process of South Asian regionalism.
Scholars of international relations generally tempt to explain Indo-Pakistan rivalry in context of their religious and ideological differences etc.
This perspective is misleading.
In fact, several other factors mainly centred on power dynamics determine and influence regional politics.
Power differentials and India’s behavior towards smaller regional countries (SRCs) seems most important factor in this respect.
Indian behavior towards all SRCs is quite similar irrespective of their religious, ideological and political orientation, and it validates the above proposition as India’s behavior towards Nepal over the last 70 years illustrates.
India and Nepal share several commonalities and have a long history of common religious, socio-cultural and linguistic identities.
Both India and Nepal have predominantly Hindu population and both of them claim to be secular states.
India’s constitution, adopted in 1949, proclaimed it as a secular state while Nepal, an erstwhile Hindu state, declared itself a secular state in the constitution adopted in 2007 that abolished monarchy and declared the country as a republic.
The last constitution adopted in 2015 also declared Nepal a secular state. About four–fifths of population of each country identifies itself as Hindu.
Both countries have close economic, social, cultural and religious affinities and they generally provide each other’s citizens the freedom to cross the border without a visa or any other travel document.
Their citizens can work and do business in both countries and a significant number of Nepalese serve in Indian armed forces.
Nepalese citizens also play significant role in defense and security of India. For instance, 25,000 Nepalese constituting about 70 per cent of the Gorkha Regiment serve in Indian army and 20,000 others in Indian police and paramilitary forces.
Nepal being a landlocked country is extremely dependent on India to interact with outside world.
Economically, it is highly integrated with India as about two-thirds of its merchandize trade is India oriented.
In 2014-15 around two-thirds of both of its exports and imports were India bound.
The rest of Nepalese trade mainly takes place through India’s territory thanks to their bilateral transit agreements while India accounts for one-third of Nepalese trade in services, two-fifths of foreign direct investment, and 100 per cent of petroleum supplies.
A substantial share of Nepalese foreign remittances comes from India. Keeping in view the high degree of economic integration and resultant (unequal) interdependence compounded with socio-cultural and religious affinities between them, one would expect good relations between the two states.
There also exist huge divergences between India and Nepal with far reaching implications for bilateral relations of both countries.
India towers over Nepal in terms of size, population, military power, natural resources, level of economic and industrial development.
India occupies a total area of 3,287,263 sq. km. and has a population of about 1.27 billion while Nepal’s overall area is 147,181 sq. km. and population around 29 million.
India has a GDP of 2.091 trillion US dollar as compared to Nepal’s GDP of 21.36 billion US dollar.
Militarily, India is a major regional and rising world power whereas Nepal is a mini state.
India is the most powerful, developed and resource–rich state of the region and Nepal one of the least developed countries.
These asymmetries can and do instill a fear among Nepalese.
However, such apprehensions could be assuaged if New Delhi played a significant role in ensuring peace, stability, progress, development and prosperity in Nepal.
Conversely, India could use its power and resources to perpetuate its dominance and consolidate privileged position in the region, by interfering in internal affairs of Nepal, in order to exploit its weakness to extract maximum concessions from it.
Generally, there is a widespread feeling among the Nepalese that India had the latter course.
It repeatedly interfered in their domestic affairs and occasionally supported revolts and insurgencies against the successive governments.
The paper aims to explore as how and why India intervened in domestic affairs of Nepal.
After introducing the theoretical framework in the next section, this paper provides a detailed appraisal of India’s intervention in internal affairs of Nepal through overt or covert support for revolts, uprising and insurgencies and underlying causes of Indian actions.
2. Theoretical Framework:
The study mainly rests on realist and neorealist perspective of international relations that focuses more on power politics defined in terms of actors’ pursuit of power maximization to attain self-interest and ensure survival in an anarchic world.
Since the study touches both domestic politics of Nepal as well as Indo-Nepalese ties, i.e. international politics, therefore, the political behavior of actors at both levels needs explanation.
Writings of classical realists such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and to some extent of Hans J. Morgenthau help explain behaviour of actors at both levels.
Both Machiavelli and Hobbes see no place of ethics in politics which must be based on realism instead of idealism.
Machiavellian political realism, thus, justifies all means (fair or unfair) to achieve political ends by actors. Hobbes believes that man is power hungry and tries to maximize his power for his survival and attainment of material benefits.
Morgenthau too believes that politics is all about power politics or the struggle to gain and maintain power.
According to Morgenthau, essence of both domestic and international politics is ‘identical’ as they both are characterized by ‘struggle for power…. The tendency to dominate, in particular, is an element of all human associations.’
Thus, power is an ultimate goal of all political actors and they can use every possible mean to achieve this end.
It also applies to states, which interact with each other in an anarchic world under a self-help system wherein own survival is their primary concern.
States are inclined to increase or maximize their capabilities or power in order to ensure their own survival and security against threats emanating from other states.
The big powers, however, in their bid to ensure their own security tend to make other states insecure.
The power politics characterized by arms buildup, balance of power, coalition-building and recurrent wars is an essence of international politics.
The small powers, however, generally become victim of power politics as the great powers tend to pursue policies that ultimately compromise former’s security, political sovereignty and economic independence, particularly of those situated in the neighborhood.
In their bilateral relations weaker states suffer the most.
It was aptly summed up by Thucydides in these words: ‘the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.’
Power inequalities also bore heavily on the smaller states in their bilateral negotiations.
During the process, powerful states strive to ‘dominate the exchange and to reach favorable outcomes at the expense of’ the weaker states.
In asymmetric power relations, the weaker side during negotiation tries to compensate for its feebleness through ‘borrowing of power’ from other resources or tactics while stronger side endeavors to ‘play out its strength’ to extract concessions and maximize the gains.
In order to realize its interests, the stronger side tries to ‘impose its will’ on the weaker side and uses ‘take-it-or-leave-it or even a take-it-or-suffer strategy.’
The outcome of negotiation is more likely to be stable if gains are satisfactory for both parties. However, if it produces uneven share of benefits for the parties, the outcome may not be durable.
The weaker side can compensate for its material weakness through relying on non-material resources, such as dedication, negotiation skills, knowledge, tactics, political will, leadership qualities, and coalition building etc.
However, some of these virtues can be found in states from the developed world or in multilateral negotiations.
Most of the developing states, particularly, small powers have a few, if any, of these qualities.
In bilateral negotiation with powerful states, they mostly find themselves at the mercy of the latter which also possess other means of coercion to advance their interests, such as use of proxies, including armed rebels, political dissidents, insurgents and terrorist groups.
The Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) is quite helpful in explaining this phenomenon.
The theory suggests that a state can sponsor proxies in order to weaken and coerce another state in a bid to: get some leverage; to extract concession on some policies, or disputes; to change or overthrow an ‘unfriendly’ government; to coerce on an unfriendly policy; to promote foreign policy objectives; and to keep influence of rival powers out of the region.
Indirect intervention through use of proxies is preferable because it is cost effective than direct intervention in terms of resource commitment and also due to possibility of denial on the part of intervening state.
PAT also informs why armed groups, political rebels, insurgents and terrorist organizations get foreign support and become proxies for a foreign power.
Faced with conflict against well-organized and better equipped state machinery, the theory elucidates, the militant groups are generally resource deficient as they lack manpower, money, training and equipment badly needed to challenge the government to attain their objectives such as: to extract maximum concessions; change or topple down the regime; acquire autonomy or complete independence etc.
In each case, these groups need to ‘mobilize a significant military capacity’ that require patrons within or outside the country.
External powers as opposed to private and domestic sponsors potentially can provide far more resources; such as money, training, sanctuaries, and equipment etc.
In sum, such groups in their bid to maximize their power and bargaining position and to extract maximum concessions, tend to get foreign support to help undermine the national government.
3. India’s Intervention in Nepal:
A brief survey of India’s foreign policy objectives in South Asia would be helpful to comprehend Indian behavior towards Nepal.
India’s regional policy since its inception was guided by power and security calculations.
Nehruvian policy was an amalgam of idealism and realism; the former to project India’s soft image globally and the latter to pursue country’s objectives regionally.
India’s realist course of action in South Asia was masked under the facade of idealism in Nehru era and was transformed into hard realism by Indira Gandhi.
Since Indian inception, its leaders ‘perceived themselves to be inheritors of the rights and privileges the British used to enjoy’ in South Asia.
As I. P Khosla observed, Indian regional policy was founded on the security notions previously practiced by British India consisting of two ‘core perceptions.’
First, it would not allow its neighbors to follow any foreign or defence policy that could possibly be ‘inimical’ to its own security.
Second, it would not permit any hostile outside power to institute its influence or existence in any of its neighbors.
Thus, India considered the whole region as a ‘single strategic unit and itself as its custodian of security and stability.’
The dogma opposed any outside engagement in South Asia.
If and when there is any external involvement, New Delhi wanted, ‘it must be for and with India.’
New Delhi aspires to expand its regional doctrine, an analogous of Monroe Doctrine, to whole of Indian Ocean region.
Indian policy and behaviour towards Nepal has been guided by the aforesaid dogma.
The present-day Nepal was established in 1769.
The British expansionism in the sub-continent threatened Nepalese survival in the nineteenth century.
However, Nepalese rulers were astute enough to protect country’s independence albeit with certain limitations.
Nepalese rulers, after country’s defeat in the British hands, concluded an agreement with the latter and accepted its ‘guidance’ in foreign affairs.
In return, the British guaranteed Nepalese domestic autonomy and security against external and internal threats. In 1923, British accepted Nepal as an independent state in a bilateral agreement.
As the British raj in India was coming to an end, Kathmandu successfully ventured to ensure its political independence and national security.
It was able to get recognition as a sovereign state from the US on 21 April 1947.
Subsequently, it also set up diplomatic ties with the US, UK and France that ‘made it impossible for India to contemplate action against Nepal, as was done against the Indian princely states.’
Reportedly, some of the Indian high officials and leaders, including deputy prime minister S. V. Patel, wanted to annex Nepal, besides Bhutan and Sikkim into Indian Union on the pattern of princely states but it was not endorsed by Nehru.
India, however, strove to claim British rights and establish its hegemony in the region.
As part of this policy, New Delhi strove to conclude with Kathmandu a number of treaties which reportedly compromised Nepalese sovereignty in several respects.
The process started as India moved towards independence.
In 1947, both countries signed two agreements including a trilateral one that makes the UK the third party.
The trilateral treaty, signed on 9 August 1947, gave the control of six of the Gurkha regiments, previously raised by British for its colonial interests, to Indian army.
Their troops were stationed in India while those deployed overseas comprising of four regiments remained under control of British army.
The treaty also allowed India to recruit Nepalese for its army under certain conditions, i.e. they would not be used against: 1) Nepal, 2) other Gurkhas, 3) Hindus, or 4) unarmed mobs.
The trilateral treaty along with a Standstill Agreement signed between India and Nepal a few months later defined the nature of bilateral relations of the two countries.
Through these agreements, India was able to establish its privileged and dominant position previously enjoyed by British India.
In return, India accepted Nepal as an independent state in line with the provisions of 1923 agreement signed between Nepal and the British India.
The treaties were signed by Nepalese rulers who were uncertain about New Delhi’s policy and attitude towards Katmandu and thus, wanted to appease India by any means.
They also expected that India would not support anti-regime and pro-democracy political groups based in India.
Later on, India and Nepal concluded several other agreements, in order to promote bilateral cooperation in security, political and economics fields.
Many of them caused more harm than good to their bilateral relations as they were regarded unjust and unequal by the Nepalese and recurrently created controversies, conflicts and tensions between the two states.
Some of the agreements were allegedly signed by Nepalese leaders under duress, a few of them, such as those signed in 1950, 1965, and 1990s, allegedly compromised Nepalese independence and risked its economic interests.
A few of the provisions of agreements or the complete treaties were reportedly undisclosed which later on created strong resentment among Nepal’s common people, intelligentsia, political parties, leaders and the rulers alike who wanted their revisions or even complete abrogation.
In several cases, India used coercive means, through indirect intervention in Nepalese affairs or supporting proxies etc. to force rulers in Katmandu to conclude these treaties and extract concessions.
Such tactics were used for regime change and to bring into power pro-India elements in Nepal and then to get concessions from indebted rulers.
India’s interference in Nepalese affairs started soon after it emerged as an independent state after the British departure, and it is being discussed in length below.
3.1 India’s Role in the Downfall of Rana Dynasty:
India interference in Nepalese affairs began when it played a crucial role in bringing down the rule of Rana family who had contributed significantly in protecting country’s independence from British expansionism in the nineteenth century and then against potential Indian threat at the end of the colonial rule in South Asia.
The Rana family ruled the country in a series of hereditary prime ministers for about a century by marginalizing the role of royal palace and relegating the successive monarchs merely as figureheads since 1846.
During this period, Rana family was able to secure country’s independence, though in a compromised manner, against expanding British Indian Empire in sub-continent.
It was also able to secure country’s sovereignty after British departure from South Asia.
Probably, it offended New Delhi that ultimately played a key role to bring down the ruling Rana family.
India’s professed love for democracy was the guise which it used to bring down the ruling family in Kathmandu.
None other than India’s friendly Nepalese living on its soil could best serve its interests.
In late 1940s, the politically exiled Nepalese in India, many of whom were previously associated with All India National Congress (AINC), formed a few political parties or groups for political activities in their country.
In 1947, they merged these parties and groups together to form Nepali Congress (NC) which started a movement for democracy in Nepal.
NC was initially a non–violent movement but it also secretly formed an armed group, People’s Independence Army or Jana Mukti Sena (JMS), to serve as a ‘fighting force’ against the rule of ‘Rana Oligarchy.’
JMS showed its muscles and in a series of armed attacks it was able to get control over seven main cities in eastern Nepal.
The rebels used Indian soil and road and railway networks with its tacit or explicit approval to transport weapons and fighters.
Even weapons were transported from Burma through using Indian air or soil and rebels also hired Indian airplanes for the purpose.
Later on, New Delhi put restrictions on militants’ activities on Indian soil.
JMS activities, however, continued in Nepal and provided India sufficient leverage to impose a political settlement on Kathmandu.
As a result of this people’s war, rule of Rana family was brought to an end with conclusion of ‘Delhi Compromise’ in February 1951.
India’s role in this entire episode was quite decisive and it reaped several benefits.
Reportedly, New Delhi was highly sympathetic to the democratic movement and actively supported ‘the process of bringing down the Rana Oligarchy.’
The final settlement was also an Indian formula imposed on the parties. In fact, the entire draft of the agreement was prepared by the then Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru without proper consultation with three parties of the conflict, i.e. the monarch, Rana prime minister, and NC leaders.
In fact, these parties never sat together and discussed the deal. Thus, it was the first occasion when India ‘“midwifed” the birth of democracy in Nepal.’
The three-point agreement provided for: introduction of democracy after elections to be organized by an interim government with NC representation under a Rana prime minister; restoration of the position of king Tribhuvan, who had earlier fled to India, and; drafting of a new constitution by a constituent assembly.
In the ensuing period, NC and other parties strove to weaken Rana prime minister by looking towards the king and consolidating his authority that ultimately strengthened royal powers and undermined prime ministerial position in the coming years.
Thus, interim government could last for a few months only. In November 1951, M. P. Koirala became first non-Rana prime minister with Indian blessings that brought an end to a century’s old Rana dynasty.
Earlier, in 1950, India was able to force on the crumbling Rana regime the Indo–Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship that severely undermined Nepalese sovereignty in several respects and caused recurrent bitterness in bilateral ties of both countries.
The letters exchanged with the treaty were not deposited to the United Nations and were kept secret for nine years, until 1959.
The evidence shows that India first supported an anti–regime movement to weaken a government in Kathmandu and then imposed on it a treaty that severely restricted Nepalese course of action in several fields including import of arms, ammunition and security related equipment etc.
Reportedly, the Rana regime had signed the draft treaty ‘virtually as proposed’ by India.
Leo Rose noted that Katmandu had agreed to the text of two treaties ‘virtually’ as drafted and proposed by India provided New Delhi would not ‘insist’ on introducing political reforms in Nepal.
Thus, a treaty of peace and friendship and another on trade and commerce was signed in Katmandu on 31 July 1950.
Both of the treaties were reportedly disadvantaged to Nepal and, later on, they caused souring of bilateral relations.
Nonetheless, India was able to extract far reaching concessions for itself from a crumbling regime.
Rana regime had accepted Indian dictates hoping that it would help survive and prolong their rule but these expectations did not materialize.
Apparently, it was not enough for India to satisfy its ambitions in Nepal and establish hegemony in the region.
Just within a year of the conclusion of the agreement, Rana dynasty was brought to an end as a result of ‘New Delhi compromise’ orchestrated by India.
It paved the way for leaders of NC, the so called democratic forces, to come into power.
But they had to compensate and reward New Delhi for the support it provided them against Rana dynasty.
In the ensuing democratic era after the 1951 Agreement, Indian influence in Nepalese domestic affairs grew to the large extent.
In this period, Kathmandu sought Indian advice on ‘virtually all political, administrative, security, and foreign policy matters.’
Some controversial bilateral agreements including those on sharing and development of shared rivers’ water (1954 and 1960) and trade and transit (1959) were also signed in this period.
When king Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev ascended to throne in 1955, he took several steps to decrease India’s influence in the country albeit to the displeasure of New Delhi.
# Its second part soon to begin with India’s Support to Armed Rebels against Panchayat System in 1960s: Upadhyaya.
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