Dr. Manzoor Ahmad Naazer
Assistant Professor, International Islamic University, Islamabad
Abstract:
Countries in South Asian being religiously, ethnically and culturally diverse are naturally prone to intrastate conflicts and tensions.
The inability of their ruling elites to grant or guard the political and economic rights of minority groups cause discontent and conflicts.
India being a powerful country and occupying central position in the region could help its neighbors to overcome their problems.
Conversely, it can exploit them to its advantage in order to extract various concessions and impose its dictates on them.
The study discusses the case of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan and finds that India chose the latter course and used support of terrorism as a tool of its foreign policy to advance its objectives in the region.
Key words: South Asia, India, Terrorism, Conflict, Insurgencies, Support, Intervention.
Introduction: South Asian Countries (SACs) share numerous commonalities such as civilization, culture, traditions and historical experiences that can coalesce them towards regional integration.
But, South Asia is also perhaps the most dissimilar region on the planet.
It is, in fact, ‘a world in miniature’ being diverse religiously, ideologically, politically, culturally, and ethnically.
Likewise, regional states in South Asia are also different.
For instance, India has six main religious communities and large ethnic diversity with around 780 sub-dialects written in 66 different scripts, 122 main dialects (spoken by over 10,000 people) and 22 scheduled (official) languages.
Each SAC has at least a single, dominant religious group in majority.
Hindus constitute 79.8 per cent and 81.3 per cent of the population in India and Nepal, respectively, while Muslims make up 96.28 per cent and 89.1 per cent of people in Pakistan and Bangladesh, respectively, and 100 per cent in case of Maldives.
Buddhists form 70.2 per cent and 75.3 per cent of the population in Sri Lanka and Bhutan, respectively.
Hindus are the largest minority in Bangladesh (10 per cent), Sri Lanka (12.6 per cent), Bhutan (22.1 per cent), and Pakistan (1.6 per cent, followed by Christians – 1.59 per cent).
Muslims constitute the largest minority in India (14.2 per cent) and the second largest minority in Sri Lanka (9.7 per cent) and Nepal (4.4 per cent). In Nepal, Buddhists (9 per cent) constitute the largest minority.
Diverse religious and ethnic minority groups residing in different SACs pose perceived or real threats and create problems and grievances, generate and stir up tensions within and between regional states.
The religious and ethnic divisions besides other issues mainly cause intra and interstate conflicts and sometimes contribute to internal strife and international wars in South Asia.
The inability of the ruling elites of SACs to grant or successfully guard the political and economic interests of their religious and ethnic minorities generally cause displeasure and uprisings in their countries.
The religious and ideological differences, perceived political estrangement, ethnic and socio-cultural sensitivities and economic exploitation and overall sense of deprivation or dissatisfaction with the existing system impels the citizenry to ultimately revolt against the state, seek autonomy or even complete separation.
Internal conflicts have over and over again challenged the national security and territorial integrity of SACs, and occasionally ignited interstate tensions in South Asia.
Though, the political elites are mainly responsible for contributing to these conflicts, the role of neighboring states in inflating them has also been instrumental.
As Eric Gonsalves notes non-state actors posed serious threats to the stability and territorial integrity of SACs and some of them were supported by neighboring countries.
‘No major country in the subcontinent can claim to have clean hands in this context.’
The article explores India’s involvement in internal conflicts and political problems of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan by asking what motivates a regional power to intervene in the internal affairs of its neighboring states; and how and why it would support armed rebels, militant groups, insurgents and terrorist organizations in its neighborhood.
Role and Motives of ‘Bad Neighbors’ in Internal Conflicts:
Internal conflicts are ‘violent or potentially violent political disputes’ mainly originating from ‘domestic rather than international systemic factors, and where armed violence takes place or threatens to take place primarily within the borders of a single state.’
They may include or involve a ‘violent power struggle’ between groups led by either military or civilian leaders on one side or both, civil wars, fierce ethnic or religious conflicts, secessionist or liberation wars, armed ideological movements, attempted or failed revolutionary struggles, revolts and failed military coups, assaults by terrorists or criminal’s groups, and insurgencies by guerilla groups of various sorts.
The key actors are generally governments and rebels but, in case of state collapse or weak governmental structures, non-state actors or non-governmental groups can also fight with each other.
Roderic Alley broadly identifies three types of internal conflicts: resource-based involving legitimacy struggles over government authority; based on ideological grounds; and identity conflicts.
Internal conflicts generally find traction when there are nations or communal groups without state; communal competitors for state power; militant religious groups; frontier people; regional autonomists; class differences, and; dominant minorities.
Ted Robert Gurr argues that communal groups, defined in terms of religious or ethnic and linguistic similarities, in their bid to defend and promote their collective self-interests were the major threats to intra and interstate peace and stability in the world.
He notes that communal groups are ‘constituted not by presence of a particular trait or combination of traits, but rather the shared perception that the defining traits, whatever they are, set group apart.’
Thus, instead of identifying characteristics, perceived differences among groups are important.
Several studies have identified the indigenous causes of internal conflicts.
For instance, Ted Robert Gurr statically analysed 227 communal groups and notes that their grievances were generally rooted in their concerns over cultural identity, political and social exclusion, economic disparities and lack of political empowerment.
Sometimes, such conflicts arose due to deliberate efforts of the political elites to use identity politics in their bid for power.
However, state power, democracy and institutional changes determine if such conflicts result in protest or rebellion. There can be multiple underlying or permissive causes (independent variables) in whose presence violent conflicts (dependent variable) can potentially arise but proximate or immediate causes (intervening variables) are more important as they can spark and ignite wars.
Michael E Brown lists 12 causes categorized under four types of factors each as underlying and proximate causes of internal conflicts.
Underlying causes include weak states, intra-security concerns, and ethnic geography under structural factors; discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics and ethnic politics under political factors; economic problems, discriminatory economic systems and economic development / modernization under economic/social factors; and patterns of cultural discrimination and problematic groups histories under cultural/ perceptual factors.
Proximate causes include collapsing states, changing intra-state military balance and changing demographic pattern (structural factors); political transitions, increasingly influential exclusionary ideologies, growing inter-group competitions and intensifying leadership struggles (political factors); mounting economic problems, growing economic inequalities, fast-paced development and modernization (economic/social factors); and intensifying patterns of cultural discrimination and ethnic bashing/ propagandizing (cultural / perceptual factors).
Several studies have also suggested a link between or interplay of domestic and international factors that can generate internal conflicts in a state. Steven E Lobell and Phillip Mauceri argue that weakening state institutions paralleled with disruption in previously agreed inter-group arrangements, particularly a major change in communal balance, can trigger intrastate conflicts with the potential to escalate and diffuse into an international conflict.
A marginalized or threatened communal group can invite outside help from religious or ethnic community that can internationalize the conflict. Thus, they posit that ‘intermestic’ forces, that is, interplay of international and domestic factors and their external and international ‘reverberations’ intensify and spread ethnic conflicts.
Foreign intervention in internal conflicts is also motivated by diverse factors and various actors can be involved in it. Alpaslan Özerdem and Sung Yong Lee point out that internal conflicts can invite intervention from international or regional organizations as well as nation states, such as former colonial powers, concerned neighbors and the regional hegemon.
Alex J Belammy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin note that the regional hegemon having vested interest in regional peace and stability plays its role in peacekeeping in the internal conflict ‘in order to press their own claims to territory, economic benefits or access to natural resources, or support to the sociopolitical ambitions of the allies.’
Freedman finds that due to illegitimacy or weak governance, some governments find themselves unwilling or unable to address their internal problems, and thus provide ‘an opening for others to use the conflict for their own purpose.’
These outsiders may be individual fighters who share ethnic or religious affinities with the groups in conflict with the rival groups or serve as proxies for a neighboring state. The actions of an intervening state may be motivated by various factors including:
• their suspicion and enmity towards rival powers or groups;
• to stop perceived oppression of their ethnic or religious brethren;
• regional or international balance of power considerations, and;
• power ambitions.
External involvement makes it difficult for the parties to reach a settlement and sometimes spoils the agreement, if concluded.
Research on internationalization of internal conflict represents two perspectives: affective and instrumental.
The affective perspective holds that external powers generally intervene because of their communal linkage or shared identity – religious, ethnic or linguistic – with one or another group, historical injustices, and humanitarian considerations etc.
Instrumentalists hold that external powers intervene in internal conflicts motivated by their thirst for rewards in the shape of material gains, such as accessing resources, or strengthening their political power domestically and increasing influence regionally or internationally.
Political elites can use communalism – ethnicity or religion – to produce, stimulate, or activate political action.
They can also exploit communal differences, through fear mongering, scapegoating or dividing people in order to gain or retain power.
Internal conflicts also arise because of greed/opportunity and grievances arising out of inequality and injustice.
More specifically, they may be caused by collapsing institutions, political exclusion and repression, economic inequalities, and sociocultural discrimination that creates a sense of relative deprivation and frustration.
In such cases, rebellion is deemed as a means to redress grievances.
The stronger the repression and discrimination, the higher would be the likelihood of revolt.
Grievances based on political and economic inequalities alone cannot create turbulence until there are resources and expectations of higher return or payoff from the conflict.
Rational calculation on the part of participants on the basis of potential material benefits and incentives to participate in a conflict are the key variables.
Religious and ethnic differences impel political exclusion and discrimination that implant internal conflicts. The rebel groups fearing that they do not have sufficient power to match the capabilities of the state seek outside help.
Neighboring states ruled by religious or ethnic kin are more likely to intervene which can also generate interstate conflicts.
The ruling elites of neighboring states may be induced because of affective or instrumental motives or can act under pervasive domestic pressure to help the allegedly beleaguered minority group across the border.
Sometimes, an external power intervenes in order to pursue or promote its own foreign policy objectives.
This role of the external power can either be positive or negative.
It can play the role of an interlocutor to help resolve the problem or to suppress conflict escalation.
Otherwise, it can encourage conflict expansion. Its motives can also be affective or instrumental: pursuance of military and security interests, economic benefits, international political compulsions, and, domestic political considerations.
However, the decision to intervene is made on the basis of rational calculation, and only when it is considered less costly. Internal conflicts can arise due to any of the four sets of immediate causes:
1. internal mass-level factors like domestic problems,
2. external mass-level factors like the role of neighboring states or ‘bad neighborhoods’,
3. internal elite-level factors like bad leaders, and,
4. external elite-level factors or ‘bad neighbors.’
Brown argues that though internal mass-level configurations and external factors such as neighbours’ related mass level ‘diffusion,’ ‘contagion’ or ‘spill-over’ effects can be immediate causes of internal conflicts, most of them are mainly triggered by the domestic, elite-level or leader-driven actions and deliberate decisions of some neighboring states.
Thus, the decisions of bad leaders and actions of bad neighbors are more important factors that cause or intensify internal conflicts.
Neighbors can occasionally be passive and ‘innocent victims’ of internal conflicts, but generally, they actively contribute ‘to violence, escalation and regional instability’ caused by such problems.
In several cases, internal conflicts are a product of the deliberate acts and discrete decisions made by important regional players:
Bad neighbors are a big problem, much bigger than conventional thinking would lead us to believe.’
The response and actions of external powers (including neighboring states) to internal conflicts may involve interventions of five types defined in terms of the motives that drive them.
This article employs an eclectic approach and mainly uses the model developed by Brown to explore India’s interference in the internal affairs of its neighboring South Asian countries.
The author also uses insights from other studies including the concept and role of the regional hegemon in internal conflicts used by Alex J Belammy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin.
The study posits that a regional power can pursue various policies, including direct or indirect intervention in its neighboring states, in order to establish or reinforce its hegemonic position; to coerce them about an unfriendly policy and to seek their deference; to project power; to broaden its influence; to promote foreign policy objectives; to extract concessions; and keep influence of rival powers out of the region.
Indirect intervention takes precedence over direct intervention because the use of militant groups as proxies is cost-effective in terms of resource commitment as it only involves assurance of equipment, finance, training, advisors, and logistic support in a secret way making it relatively more difficult to gauge.
India’s Foreign Policy towards South Asia:
A brief discussion of India’s foreign policy towards South Asia will be helpful in comprehending her motives and actions in the region.
In the post-independence period, India’s foreign policy was guided by the five principles or Panchsheel (panch-sila). India’s leadership strove to play the role of leader of the Third World by either championing the cause of anti-colonialism or non-alignment.
Non-alignment was believed to be the best way to guarantee the country’s sovereignty and to keep her away from the Cold War power politics.
This helped India act out the part ‘as a champion of peace and freedom’. In the post-Cold War era, India’s policy has transformed from non-alignment to courtship of countries like the United States (US) because of the former’s quest to become a major player in world politics and the latter’s policy to contain China.
Stable and rapid economic growth is the key to India’s global ambitions which necessitates peace at home and stability in the neighbourhood. India wants to pursue regional connectivity and economic integration to augment its growth process.
It also seeks to play the role of a regional stabilizer in South Asia.
India’s policy towards South Asia since its inception has been motivated by its power and security considerations.
In fact, Nehru’s foreign policy was mainly a blend of idealism and realism, but not exclusively the former to present the country’s soft image to the world, and the latter to pursue the country’s objectives in the region.
India’s realist courses of action, however, was veiled under the guise of idealism during the Nehru era, transformed into hard realism by Indira Gandhi.
In the post-independence period, India’s leaders ‘perceived themselves to be inheritors of the rights and privileges the British used to enjoy’ in South Asia.
New Delhi strove to continue imperial policies towards regional states, particularly Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim who were virtually British protectorates in the past.
India not only inherited British strategic thinking but also imitated the US imperialist dogma – the Monroe Doctrine.
As J. P Khosla observes, India’s foreign policy towards South Asia is based on the security concepts initiated under British India. It has two ‘core perceptions.’
First, India would not permit its neighbours to pursue any defence or foreign policy that could potentially be ‘inimical’ to its own security. Second, it would not allow any unfriendly external power to establish its influence or presence in any of its neighbouring state.
Under this strategic dogma, India views South Asia as a ‘single strategic unit and itself as its custodian of security and stability’.
The doctrine opposed any external involvement in the region.
If and when there is some outside involvement, ‘it must be for and with India.’ India also wanted to expand this doctrine to the Indian Ocean region.
In order to consolidate its security considerations and hegemonic position in South Asia.
India signed various agreements with its neighbours: with Bhutan in 1949 which provided that the Bhutanese foreign policy would be guided by India’s advice; with Nepal in 1950 which said that neither party would tolerate any threat to the security of the other by any external power; with Bangladesh in 1972 which stated that neither party would join a military alliance or permit its territory to be used against the security of other state; and with Sri Lanka in 1987 which provided that both parties would not allow the use of their territories for activities detrimental to the security, unity and territorial integrity of other state.
India also offered Pakistan the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation in 1949 and repeated this offer in response to Pakistan’s no-war pact in 1981.
Earlier, Indian leaders had not accepted the existence of Pakistan sincerely and had supposed partition as an ‘unavoidable expedient’ which would be ‘short lived.’
At worst, they hoped that Pakistan would ‘settle down as a deferential junior partner within an Indian sphere of influence.’
Besides, India also signed a ‘secret’ arms supply agreement with Nepal in 1965 which severely undermined the latter’s autonomy.
Yet in 1990, the Man Mohan Singh government forwarded Kathmandu a draft treaty whose provisions, if accepted, could have resulted into loss of Nepalese sovereignty.
Thus, S. D. Muni rightly observed, at different times and on different issues that ‘Indian policy and diplomacy’ towards its neighbours, reflected ‘a colonial mindset and a domineering personal style.’
It did not heed to the Nepalese demand of revising their bilateral agreement of 1950 and opposed Bhutan’s aspirations to establish direct diplomatic relations with other states, including China.
Occasionally, its policy was characterized by ‘an attitudinal aggressiveness and a value-oriented arrogance’ that was interpreted by SRCs as Indian ‘hegemonism.’
India strove to impose its hegemony in the region through direct or indirect use of force. It forcefully annexed several princely states soon after Partition in 1947, and also Sikkim, a tiny state in the Himalayas, in 1974.
New Delhi used brute force to occupy and then retain its unlawful control over Jammu and Kashmir from the onset. It ‘midwifed’ the creation of Bangladesh by supporting Mukti Bahini – a militant rebel group, and then by openly intervening in East Pakistan in 1971.
India has political problems and bilateral disputes with most of its neighbours and generally does not enjoy good relations with them, except Bhutan and the Maldives.
New Delhi also used armed rebels, insurgents and terrorist organisations in SCRs in order to coerce them to change their policies, extract concessions or to project power, and increase its influence in the region.
Acknowledgement:
# The author is indebted to the Department of International Studies, University of North Carolina Wilmington (UNCW), North Carolina, USA, and the library staff for their dedicated assistance in completion of this research during post-doctorate research at the university.
# The author is Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan.
# Article Published with the permission of the distinguished author (Published, 2018 by Islamabad Policy Research Institute).
# Thanks the author and IPRI (Islamabad Policy Research Institute).