Nepal’s Security: Domestic Perspective

Historical backdrop:

It is logical to begin from Prithivi Narayan Shah who forged a unified nation in 1768 out of a plethora of warring, hill principalities in the heyday of British colonialism.

His pioneering role in shaping Nepal’s foreign and security policy was based on a sound grasp of geo-politics, stemming from Nepal’s uncomfortable location — in his vivid imagery: a yam between the rocks of imperial China and British India.

The essential wisdom of his sage counsel in Divyopadesh-“maintain friendly relations with the Emperor of China. Great friendship should also be maintained with the Emperor beyond the Seven Seas, but he is clever- Do not engage in offensive acts. Fighting should be conducted on a defensive basis” — is valid even today.

Jang Bahadur’s essentially pro-British policy, following his ascendancy in 1846, was relevant to Nepal’s quest for security in the colonial era. “An important political/security byproduct of such a calculated strategy was to denude all incentive for the British to meddle or otherwise intervene in Nepal’s domestic affairs.”

To be sure, Jang Bahadur wished, by so doing, to prolong Rana rule. Yet, one crucial outcome was Britain acknowledging, in a formal treaty in 1923, Nepal’s status as a fully independent and sovereign nation.

Modern era:

Given Nepal’s geo-political situation, her foreign/security policy must necessarily take that fully into account.

Unfortunately, there are different interpretations to geography, as we know from Pundit Nehru’s statement in parliament in 1950, “From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with magnificent barriers...We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India. Therefore as much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security.”

“Even Chandra Shumsher, who later became Prime Minister (1901 to 1929) became the greatest ally and friend of the British, was reported to have said openly to the British envoy as late as 1890 that since Nepal was subordinate to China, in no way could it be subordinate to the British Government of India.”

Nepal’s sense of security was boosted following the establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1955, the formalization of a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1960, the opening of a residential Chinese embassy the same year, and the agreement in 1961 to construct a highway connecting Kathmandu to Kodari, already linked to Lhasa.

Security through expanded contacts:

Nepal’s relentless urge to strengthen national security was pursued through expansion of international contacts, even by the Ranas.

As much is underlined by Nepal’s dogged pursuit of UN membership, which she finally secured in 1955. Notably, the decision to twice contest — successfully — for nonpermanent membership to the UN Security Council was driven by national security considerations.

Much earlier, in March 1947, she participated at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi; the April 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung; and succeeded in become a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

Bangladesh creation/Sikkim absorption:

The creation of Bangladesh and the annexation of Sikkim by India in the 1970s had a profound impact as the carefully planned dismemberment of Pakistan through a 20-year Pact between India and the Soviet Union was noted with deep anxiety.

Faced with a fait accompli Nepal has no option but to accept the reality of Bangladesh. Yet, its effect on her national security mindset would become dramatically manifest in less than two years’ time, triggered by developments in Sikkim through a carefully orchestrated anti -Chogyal movement which paved the way for Sikkim’s integration in 1975 with an India that had played a key interventionist, behind-the-scenes role.

Repercussions in Kathmandu were immediate. Foreign Minister Gyanendra Bahadur Karki voiced Nepal’s protest against ‘foreign interference’ in the internal affairs of nations; the Nepali media charged India with ‘imperial designs’; while massive anti-Indian demonstrations were staged by students.

The obliteration of Sikkim’s distinct identity and the uprooting of a dynasty which could be traced back at least to 1642, set the stage for a fundamental re-think of Nepal’s strategic options

Zone of Peace (ZOP) Proposal:

Though Nepal was impotent to change the facts on the ground in Sikkim, King Birendra came up with a demarche that was to have far-reaching ramifications. It took the form of a proposal, unveiled in Kathmandu in 1975, to have Nepal internationally accepted as a Zone of Peace.

Its rationale was projected elliptically, “We are not prompted out of fear or threat from any country or quarter...As heirs to a country that has always lived in independence, we wish to see that our freedom and independence shall not be thwarted by the changing flux of time...when conciliation is replaced by belligerency and war.”

By the time of the 1990 Popular Movement, although 116 nations had extended support to ZOP, India refused to do so. Over the years, India’s mainstream media had made it abundantly clear that India’s refusal was rooted on the assumption that endorsement would cancel her special status, purportedly secured by the 1950 Treaty.

ZOP was formally cremated when the drafters of the 1990 Constitution in their wisdom threw out the ZOP baby along with the Panchayat bathwater.

National Security Goals/Policy Sidelined

The period roughly from 1990 to 2006 saw the willful neglect of national security goals/policies.

For long, “Foreign policy issues were solely decided by the prime minister...without virtually any debate in political circles or...much input from HMG’s ministry of foreign affairs.”

Even an attempt by academics to set up an institute to pursue strategic studies was spiked by the government installed after the 1991 general elections!

Bhutanese refugees:

It was in this opaque environment that Nepal’s prime minister on an official visit to India in December 1991 told the media that the expulsion of southern Bhutanese by the Thimpu regime was Bhutan’s domestic matter.

Within a year, the Bhutanese refugee population in Nepal shot up from around 10,000 to around 100,000. The issue has lingered for nearly two decades.

Nepal’s handling of the issue has been incompetent, unfocused and totally lacking in an understanding of its larger strategic politico-demographic underpinnings.

At various times, Indian media accounts have alleged that Nepal’s Maoists are inspiring, if not guiding, a Communist revolution in Bhutan. If that, indeed, is the case it could have profound ramifications, especially as India — after its Nepal experience — probably will not have much stomach to stoke a revolution in Bhutan, a la Nepal.

Security-consciousness lacking:

A striking lack of security-consciousness among policy planners was manifest following India and Pakistan conducting successful nuclear tests in May 1989, with there being no visible official cognizance of the significance of such a strategic transformation of the region.

Similarly, there doesn’t seem to have been any official analysis of the impact on small states of the demise of the Cold War: after all, Cold War politics had checked the might and propensity of regional powers to pursue an interventionist policy vis-à-vis their weaker neighbors.

Another glaring example finds reflection in successive post-1990 governments’ apparent unwillingness to stem the flow of illegal migrants and criminals across the open Nepal-India border.

SAARC:

Although security/terrorism has now become a fixture of SAARC summits, one is not aware of any great success by SAARC in containing terrorism, including in Nepal during the decade of the “people’s war” when the Maoists were declared as terrorists and operated from foreign soil.

Post-2006: General:

Concerns of China and India have often been projected as a zero-sum game and have a direct, disconcerting bearing on our national security. If hardliners in India even saw a Chinese hand in the recent beating up of two Indian priests, a senior Chinese leader in a speech before a high-level audience blamed the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Youth Congress- both based in India - for last years’ bloody demonstrations in Lhasa, which, as we know, set off serial protests in Kathmandu, too.

If King Gyanendra’s role in securing an observer role in SAARC proved very costly for him, Maoist chairman Prachanda, too, seems to have paid a stiff price for allegedly pandering to Beijing: he not only cancelled his ‘historic’ visit to China sometime back but shortly thereafter resigned as prime minister accusing India, among others, of having plotted his government’s downfall.

Domestic determinants: Armed Forces, etc:

Among domestic security problems, that of integrating ex-PLA guerrillas is the knottiest. Although some hopes were held out by the reconstitution of the Special Committee on Army Integration, divergent views prevail: while Maoists favor en masse this is strongly opposed by the Nepal Army, among others.

That is linked with a gamut of sensitive issues, including the optimum strength of the Army and the two police forces, not to mention the intelligence service. For that, all major stakeholders will first have to reach agreement on a common threat perception, and related political goals. Besides, there is the ticklish question of whether such issues should be settled now or only after a new constitution and an elected government with the requisite mandate are in place.

Most fundamentally, the biggest internal threat to national security comes from the unseemly spectacle of constant squabbling among political leaders and their cadres: the more that happens, the more likely is it to invite foreign intervention.

Since national security, by definition, concerns all, it behooves all to help generate the necessary degree of public awareness of looming dangers.

Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal’s September 15, 2009 directive to the National Defense Council to prepare a national security policy is encouraging.

I believe that contributions of research bodies such as the Sangam Institute, which has sponsored this ground-breaking seminar, can greatly assist official efforts, by-consciously and constantly developing and elevating national security-consciousness.

Recommendation/conclusions:

1. ZOP should be revived, perhaps in some modified manner, to harmonize the security concerns of Nepal, China and India, so manifest today. If policy makers are not careful about tackling them in time, it could lead to serious national security mishaps. Such an instrument could also be effective in controlling security-related problems in territory close to the Indian and Chinese borders.

2. Building up of national security-consciousness, systematically and at different levels, among other means by study and research conducted by professionals, on a non-partisan basis.

3. Rejection of any move to re-instate the obsolete colonial theory that the Himalayas are a security barrier for India vis-à-vis China: in today’s nuclear age of intercontinental ballistic missiles, that is no more than a myth. It was, incidentally, exploded in 1962. Attempts to insert that flawed concept into any treaty with India, through insertion of the ‘special relations’ thesis, must be resisted.

4. A well-trained, well-equipped and adequately motivated Border Security Force should be set up to monitor Nepal’s borders with India and China. Perhaps here ex-PLA combatants, among others, might find space.

5. Another security force trained and equipped to guard on-going and proposed mega projects, including hydro-plants, might also be considered as also personnel trained to tackle security-related problems likely to crop up as a byproduct of climate change.

6. With myriad security problems burgeoning, the security forces of the state must not be demoralized but built-up, strengthened and adequate incentives provided to attract the best and the brightest as recruits.

A seminar paper presented by the author on National Security of Nepal: Thinking Ahead” organized by the SANGAM Institute last month. Excerpts only with author’s permission-ed.

Posted on : 2009-10-28 14:29:49

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